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Abstract 
Corruption manifests itself in many ways and at different levels. Corrupt behavior causes 
outrage to victims and those who value civil society, it impedes good government and 
administrative practice. The policy challenge in reducing corruption is to identify the 
component parts of corrupt behavior and the risk–reward profiles of offenders. This 
exploratory article begins this process by reporting data from 100 successfully prosecuted 
cases from New York City. The study analyses data on varying degrees of corruption in service 
provision in New York City. The loss to the city is much more a loss of governance capacity 
than it is a monetary loss. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Corruption often hits the headlines as politicians are found out when they accept bribes, use 
their public offices to enrich themselves their families and supporters, and play fast and 
loose with the rules of well-organized societies. The activities of minor level officials who 
may take smaller bribes and smaller risks rarely find their way into the public arena. In the 
United States (U.S.) where there is a strong legislative base, with severe penalties for corrupt 
behavior, corruption nevertheless abounds. American media frequently claim that every 
Democrat elected governor of Illinois in the past 50 years has either gone to jail or been 
impeached. The most recent Republican Governor also has spent time in prison for 
corruption. Five of the last seven mayors of Newark New Jersey have either gone to prison 
or been indicted on corruption related charges. In February 2009 Chicago City Alderman 
Arenda Troutman was sentenced to four years in prison for corruption, becoming the 28th 
Chicago Alderman since 1972 to be sent to prison. In Pennsylvania in 2009 two senior judges 
were indicted for taking kickbacks for sentencing juveniles to a privately run correctional 
facility. 
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It is a puzzle as to why the legal framework and the law enforcement system has not been 
able to make a greater impact on corrupt behavior, though many theories can be put 
forward. Northern European countries with similar legislation have a much lower prevalence 
of corruption while some southern and eastern European countries have a much higher 
prevalence. Some countries in Africa, Asia and South America have horrendous corruption 
profiles. 
 
Corrupt behavior hurts people, it causes outrage to victims and those who value civil 
society, and it impedes good government and administrative practice. Corruption has 
featured in government since the beginning of time, and it could be simply defined as “the 
abuse of public office or public position for private gain” (United Nations Development 
Program and Global Integrity 2008). Due to its pernicious effects, in modern societies 
corruption is regarded as highly undesirable and numerous efforts are made to contain 
and combat corruption, especially when related to the search for private economic gain. 
 
Data upon which anti-corruption strategies are developed is not systematically collected, 
and this paper attempts to provide some insight into the nature and type of corruption in 
New York City. The data reported in this study from the city’s Department of Investigation 
found overwhelmingly that the financial stakes were very small, but the governance 
capacity loss to the city was large. It was capacity loss rather than monetary loss that was 
the main effect of the cases examined. 
 
The policy challenge in reducing corruption is to identify the component parts of corrupt 
behavior and the risk and reward profiles of offenders. This study begins this process by 
reporting data from 100 successfully prosecuted cases from New York City. 
 
II. Scope and Sphere of Corruption 
 
Nearly everyone has views about what activities and behaviors are deemed corrupt but there 
is a lack of consensus on the definition of corruption given its multifaceted nature.  Activities 
that involve bribery and graft, extortion, kickbacks, misappropriation theft and fraud by virtue 
of one’s position, self-dealing, patronage, abuse of discretion, creating or exploiting conflict of 
interest, nepotism, clientelism and favoritism, as well as political manipulation are all generally 
agreed to constitute corrupt behavior. These various corrupt behaviors occur in different 
activities and different sectors of all societies.  Most commonly these apply in domains such 
as: buying things (procurement processes, issuing contracts etc.); appointing personnel; 
delivering programs or services; making things (road construction, major capital works, 
housing developments etc.); controlling activities (licensing / regulation/ issuing of permits 
etc.); and many forms of administering (justice mostly, but also health, environmental 
services.).   
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Corruption is larger than municipal corruption nevertheless, and the losses and other 
effects that it produces may well be different in different settings. Therefore, corruption 
can be classified according to its scope and sphere, at three levels, each with a different 
effect on society (Langseth 2007, 9). A first level implies petty corruption. This involves 
primarily low-level civil servants in small acts (such as a police officer taking a bribe to 
negate a traffic ticket). A second level is grand corruption, where political leaders, high-
level public servants or major elected officers perform acts that affect the credibility of 
the system and the basis of its functioning (e.g., a political leader personally benefitting 
from major development projects, a judge who takes a bribe to resolve a case). Finally, 
state capture implies the manipulation by those not formally in power, of the institutions 
of the state and its economic direction (e.g., business interests “controlling” politicians 
and relying on their patronage to allow them to own and profit from formerly state owned 
enterprises and assets.) In this sphere the state itself functions as a corrupt mechanism 
(U4 Anti-Corruption resource Center n.d.). 
 
Historians have documented ancient and recent manifestations of the phenomenon 
(Friedrich 1972).  Tammany Hall was a euphemism  for multifarious corrupt practices 
(Werner 1932) while the processes of corruption over time were documented in V.O Key’s 
classic Politics, parties and pressure groups (Key 1958).  Anthropologists have studied gifts, 
bribes and patronage in different cultures while lawyers have written extensively on the rule 
of law and the jurisprudence surrounding corruption. 
 
“Syndromes of corruption” are very usefully identified by Michael Johnston.  While his 
analysis is on nation states where he uses country level data to illustrate his thesis, his 
syndrome of “influence markets” is relevant in this context (Johnston 2005, 39-43).  Other 
syndromes such as “elite cartels”, “oligarchs and clans” and “official moguls” do not 
characterize New York City today.  Influence markets exist in mature democracies where 
there is steady competition and widespread political participation.  At the national level the 
syndrome of influence market corruption mostly causes damage to the system.  The data 
reported below confirms damage to the governance capacity of New York City. 
 
Moving from syndromes to cultures, Eric Uslaner (2008) demonstrates that people who 
make corrupt payments feel a sense of high inequality and have low trust.  Although these 
cultures were not examined in this study, Uslaner stresses that malfeasance derives from the 
absence of transparency.  In New York the manipulation or disregard of the required 
transparency created a situation where corruption could occur.  As Uslaner points out “the 
excluded party is almost always the loser in the corrupt transaction” (Uslaner, 2008, 9).  In 
the transactions reported below the city was the excluded party and as such, NYC lost 
governance capacity as a result of these apparently small transgressions. 
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From the seminal work of Susan Rose Ackerman (1975) on the economics of corruption to 
more recent comprehensive analyses of corruption (see, for example Aidt 2003) economists 
have examined it in virtually every aspect of macroeconomic and microeconomic behavior 
and in the allocation, distribution and delivery of goods and services. Rose-Ackerman (1999) 
weaves many threads together by examining the economic impact of corruption and how 
high level officials manipulate political power and civil service processes, especially in the 
development context. Our study however, focuses on low level officials, 
 
Thus conceptualizing corruption at this level is to see it as administrative, when it focuses 
on a public officer or servant as the main mechanism, and it reaches into the lower levels 
of the bureaucracy in their daily functions. It can be seen as political, when it affects 
higher public officers or elected politicians in their sphere of policies and rules decision 
(Bracking 2007, 5-6). 
 
Rose-Ackerman (1999, 113-126) outlines a range of corruption situations and models.  
When there is a powerful corrupt public official (i.e.a head of the state) and multiple 
bribers, there is a kleptocracy, in which the public officer will extract as much benefit as 
possible from any transaction. When there is only one briber, or very few, and still only 
one powerful corrupt public official, there is a bilateral monopoly, in which both parts 
divide the benefits of the illegal activity, depending on the relative force of each part. If 
there is one powerful briber and many low-level public servants, there is a mafia-
dominated situation, where the private client defines the policies and uses public power in 
his own interest. Finally, in a competitive bribery situation, there are many low-level 
public officers willing to take bribes and many bribers willing to pay for them, similar to a 
competitive market, but with the risk of a corruption spiral. 
 
Other classifications can be brought into play, such as regulatory corruption, judicial 
corruption, electoral corruption, etc (for additional discussion about other definitions see 
Huberts, Lasthuizen and Peeters 2007; Rose-Ackerman 1999). However, as a general 
approach, it is possible to argue that corrupt conduct depends on both the general 
opportunities available, and the specific structure of corrupt acts that are possible at a 
specific time and place (Hors 2001). 
 
One way forward is to focus on specific acts in localities and build a model that can be tested 
empirically in a search for more effective controls.  The focus therefore is not on “grand 
corruption” but rather on everyday corrupt acts that can be explained by routine activity 
theory (Cohen and Felson 1979) which can be used to explain corruption and can be 
employed in its prevention.  In the examples below we have in all cases the elements of 
routine activity theory, a motivated offender, a suitable target and the absence of a capable 
guardian.  The contexts provide significant opportunities, and by understanding these 
opportunities we can better test what sorts of controls might be applicable. 
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Depending on the relative difference of power between the public servant and bribers, 
the corrupt act could be extortive or consensual. This study focuses on administrative 
corruption only, where it is either extortive or consensual. 
 
III. Department of Investigation of the City of New York 
 
The cases that comprise this study were taken from the Department of Investigation (DOI) 
of the City of New York. This is a large and traditional anti-corruption agency, which 
focuses both on administrative and political corruption. Over the years, New York City 
officials (like many city officials elsewhere) had gained notoriety for perpetrating 
corruption, fraud, bribery and theft with impunity. However, it was not possible for the 
New York Police Department (NYPD) to tackle all these cases effectively without 
jeopardizing their major role of maintaining law and order in the city and protecting the 
people from violent crime. 
 
The DOI therefore was founded in 1873 to serve as an independent and non-partisan 
watchdog for the New York City government, and was specifically delegated the role of 
dealing promptly and effectively with cases of corruption which were eating into the 
coffers of the city government (New York City Department of Investigation 2009). 
 
As such, the DOI is one of the oldest law enforcement agencies in the US focusing on 
fighting corruption. Its main role is to combat corruption in public institutions in New York 
City and ensure that public officials do not use their position for private gain. 
 
The DOI consists of attorneys, investigators, forensic auditors, computer forensic 
specialists and administrative personnel. There are 300,000 employees in the New York 
City government, and major functions of the DOI include investigating and referring for 
criminal prosecution, cases of fraud, corruption and unethical conduct by city employees, 
contractors and others who receive city money. It also studies agency procedures to 
identify corruption hazards and recommends improvements in order to reduce the city’s 
vulnerability to fraud, waste and corruption. In addition, the DOI investigates the 
background of persons selected to work in decision-making or sensitive city jobs, and 
conduct checks on those who are awarded contracts with the city to determine if they are 
suited to serve the public trust. The DOI also recovers the city’s stolen funds and protects 
the city’s finances by pursuing criminal and civil forfeiture, restitution and other types of 
financial recovery. In this aspect, DOI officers work closely with the various prosecutorial 
agencies, in order to maximize the city’s financial recoveries. Because of DOI 
investigations, in 2009 more than $27 million was ordered or agreed to in restitution, 
forfeitures and other financial recoveries on behalf of the City and other victims (New 
York City Department of Investigation 2009). 
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The impact of DOI’s work has been evaluated at different stages of its operation. One of 
the first public evaluations, made by one Columbia University scholar and DOI senior 
officer (Seidman, 1941), focused on DOI’s capacity to build better management in New 
York City. Seidman argued that DOI’s existence as a dedicated agency with a focus on 
improving efficiency and tackling corruption puts DOI in a better institutional position to 
accomplish this mission than other units that form part of other agencies, thus becoming 
a useful example for other municipal governments. At the same time, Seidman argued 
that DOI was especially relevant in mayor La Guardia’s efforts to tackle political machine 
run corruption in New York City, which was one of the important management problems 
in the city during the 1930s’. The problem was the high dependence of the DOI on the 
mayor’s political will. 
 
The report of the New York State Organized Crime Task Force to Governor Mario Cuomo 
(1990), whose subject was corruption and racketeering in the New York City Construction 
Industry produced a similar picture about the problems that DOI faced in New York City 
during the 1980’s. This report concluded with several proposals to overcome the 
intervention of organized crime, the criminal syndicate, and Cosa Nostra, as well as high-
level political leaders’ corrupt acts, bringing together a picture of state capture. 
 
The pervasiveness of negative findings related to municipal corruption in New York City  
across different moments in time, seem to represent a case of what has been called public 
values failure (Bozeman, 2007), which could merit a separate study in municipal 
management. 
 
IV. Data and Method 
 
One hundred cases which the DOI had investigated and resolved, were considered for this 
study. Beginning with cases in 2009 and going backwards, 100 cases were selected in 
chronological order. They were not randomly selected or assigned. However, not all were 
corruption cases. Twenty-eight cases were eliminated, because although they were 
prosecuted, they were deemed to be assault, theft, fraud or forgery.  We eliminated them 
because they were criminal activities that could have occurred in any corporation or 
employment context.  These cases were not assessed as corrupt acts, since they did not 
primarily involve the misuse of a public function to gain access to a criminal opportunity.. 
 
Consequently 72 cases remained. These involved more than 72 perpetrators. Some 
examples of the type of cases in the study are listed here: 
 
1. A water use inspector at the City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) was 
arrested in 2005 for soliciting and receiving bribes from four people who faced stiff 
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fines for water use violations and/or costly repairs to their water meters. He offered 
to overlook violations in return for payments of between $100 and $250. 
2. Seven employees of the New York City Human Resources Administration/ 
Department of Social Services and eight other individuals generated Medicaid cards 
(meant for the city’s neediest and most vulnerable people) in exchange for a cash 
fee of approximately $300-$400 per card. This scheme led to the Medicaid Program 
losing an estimated $3.9 million. (2007) 
3. An employee of the City Department of Parks and Recreation (DPR) received $120 
from a person obligated to perform community service as a part of an alternative 
sentence program, to let him leave early without performing the services. (2007) 
4. In collusion with a supervisor of adoptions at the City Administration for Children’s 
Services, three persons presented false adoption claims for subsidies during 2007 
and 2008. They received a total of $159,389, and then shared the money with the 
official. 
5. A technician was arrested for accepting a $100 bribe to alter drug test results. Her 
role was to collect urine samples as part of pre-employment testing of all job 
applicants for the New York City Housing Authority.(2006) 
6. A factory operator offered $700 to a Department of Buildings (DOB) boiler inspector 
to overlook unsafe boiler violations at a factory in Brooklyn. (2007) 
7. Six employees of the City’s Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC) sold confidential 
patient information to personal injury attorneys. Amount not specified. (2009) 
8. Four building contractors offered $500 to an undercover officer posing as a 
Department of Buildings Agent, to overlook several building code violations related 
to scaffolding safety issues. (2007) 
9. A New York State assembly woman offered her help to a private contractor to 
acquire city-owned land in her district and in exchange the contractor had to build a 
house for her valued in $500,000. (2008) 
10. A subsurface plumbing company manager paid bribes to a New York City 
Department of Buildings (DOB) inspector in exchange for his overlooking codes 
applicable to the DOB and the City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), 
and expediting DOB and DEP inspections and approvals. In so doing they received 
federal program funds. (2007) 
11. Four restaurant owners in Brooklyn were arrested for paying bribes, ranging from 
$100 to $200, to DOI undercover investigators who posed as City Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) inspectors to avoid summonses for Health 
Code violations. (2007) 
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12. Between October 1999 and January 2005, a State Senator used his position and 
influence to obtain financing funds for two non-profit organizations. Much of this 
money (approximately $575,000) was diverted to pay his personal expenses. 
 
It is important to note that these cases are not a representation of all the corruption that 
exists in New York City, but rather a representation of the cases that have been 
investigated by the City’s watchdog agency. 
 
These 72 cases provided an interesting insight into DOI’s everyday work, and into 
municipal corruption in New York City. However, since this sample was not randomly 
generated, and since there was a purposive selection of the cases included in this review, 
caution should be applied to any generalization1. Nevertheless, findings in this study 
provide an interesting foundation for future development of a research program to 
address some specific topics, as we mention in our conclusions. 
 
Furthermore, it is important to study the penalties levied.  A key issue in enforcement is 
the expected penalty.  Penalties are not examined in this article, but an important topic 
for a subsequent paper is whether penalties are tied to the bribers’ monetary gains or the 
governance capacity loss to the city. 
 
V. Findings and Discussion 
 
This wide variety of corruption activities and personnel led to development of a 
classification of 10 sets of variables: 
 
1. Was the initiating offender a public servant or a private citizen? The fact that a 
public servant initiates the offense, for example by proposing or demanding the 
payment of a bribe or kickback,  together with other variables, could help to detect 
if there was an important level of coercive bribes. 
2. Was the main beneficiary a public servant or a private citizen? Here the question is 
who obtains the most from the corrupt act? The city and the public are the losers. 
On the back of the city’s loss (of capacity or money) the beneficiary can either be a 
public servant receiving money in addition to salary to which s/he is not entitled, or 
a private citizen whose business is facilitated or enhanced by way of a corrupt 
payment.  This can serve as a proxy indicator for possible extortive bribes.  
3. Were the perpetrators acting alone or as team? 
4. What kind of public servant was involved? Some positions have more opportunity 
or more vulnerability. We used four categories: (a) Inspectors, a term used to 
1 In particular, data and findings in this study suffer of deficiencies in external validity, since several biases 
threat the validity of the extrapolation and interpolation of the conclusions. 
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describe public servants in charge of reviewing legal requirements when performing 
regulated activities; (b) Supervisors and managers; (c) Politicians, namely elected 
officers; and (d) Low-level public servants with something to sell, people who 
delivered services, without decision-making authority, but with access to scarce or 
required services. 
5. Size of bribe, kickback or misappropriation. Given that the range was from a few 
dollars to many millions of dollars it was not feasible to have even categories for the 
analysis. 
6. Kind of infraction focused not on the conduct of the public servant, but on the 
meaning of that conduct, and we used three categories, violating regulations, theft, 
and abuse of political influence. 
7. Sector in which infractions occurred were infrastructure, mainly construction, health 
and environment, and human services. 
8. Process described whether corrupt acts were a violation of existing regulations or 
went further to proactively create an opportunity for private gain. 
9. Nature of the activity described controlling and implementing regulations; 
procurement or contract administration; theft; or appointing personnel and claiming 
expenses. 
10. Result was categorized as either financial loss to the city or a loss of governance 
capacity. This is the immediate result of each item of criminal conduct. This is not 
the long term outcome, for our focus in this study is the immediate result of the 
criminal conduct, not the final product of the case. This means that any case 
deemed as governance capacity loss implies that the city was not able deliver to its 
citizens that which it had legislated and for which it had provided an administrative 
apparatus. It could not obtain from the public servant conduct of appropriate 
oversight and regulatory compliance, because of the corrupt act.  
 
Table 1 summarizes these data. 
 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 
In a nutshell, about half the initiating offenders in this sample were public servants and 
half private citizens, and with the city the loser, the beneficiary was just as likely to be a 
public servant as a private citizen.  Although the sample was small, there is no evidence of 
a major public servant initiated extortion racket, or a citizen-led undermining of city 
procedures.  Opportunities for corrupt behavior fall fairly evenly.  Eighty percent of the 
offenders acted alone, and in most cases the public servant involved received a very low 
payment (56% received less than $1,000, though in four cases the amounts involved were 
in the millions). 
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Some positions have more opportunity or more vulnerability. Of the four categories of 
public servants involved, about half the cases fell into one category, the inspector 
category. Inspectors have discretion and often monopoly power. One-fifth of cases 
involved supervisors and managers. Elected officials were a very small proportion of these 
cases. Only five cases (7%) involved a politician, so they have not been detected as 
habitual players in this administrative market. Low-level public servants comprised almost 
one-quarter of cases. As noted these were people with something to sell or access to 
scarce or required services rather than monopoly discretion. Payments varied from a few 
dollars to many millions of dollars, though most were small amounts.  
 
Following Rose-Ackerman (1978), we could speculate on the low amount of the payments 
involved. Only a few cases involved high-level public servants, and in those cases 
payments were higher. Also the service provided was more difficult to obtain through 
alternative means. The majority of the cases involved low-level employees, most of them 
inspectors or supervisors, whose salaries are low, and whose decision-making capacities 
are more restricted in scope and in temporal effect. Inspectors and supervisors work 
implies an oversight of a generally ongoing private or public operation. 
 
The approval they provide is often only one of many, and people inspected might not be 
willing to pay higher amounts of money knowing that the decision made is essentially 
provisional. However, these low-level employees still have the capacity of disturbing 
everyday operations of private business, creating an opportunity for corruption to arise 
when prices for approval are low enough. Finally, the perceived low level of risk faced by 
both public employees and private counterparts could help to explain the low amount of 
most of the bribes reported here. 
 
Given the massive volume of the city’s supervision or inspections, this could foster the 
creation of what Rose-Ackerman calls a competitive bribery market (Rose-Ackerman, 
1978, pp. 124-125). However, further study is needed to assess this possibility, controlling 
for other possible relevant variables, such as the severity of punishment, penalties and 
sentences, as well as the existent level of control over those officers. 
 
In almost three-quarters of the cases there was a violation of regulations for better 
functioning, either of the city or a regulated private activity, and in one-fifth, funds were 
corruptly stolen, while abuse of political power occurred in a small number of cases. The 
most prevalent sector in which infractions occurred was infrastructure, mainly 
construction. Next was human services, which included subsidies and publicly delivered 
services. The third category, almost tied with the second, was health and environment, 
including all kind of regulated activities in which public health or environmental aspects 
were the protected public interest (i.e. hygiene in restaurants or clean water). 
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About two-thirds of the corrupt acts were violations of existing regulations, and about 
one-third were creation of opportunity for private gain. In other words, the opportunity 
was already there and something could be overlooked, rather than the officials setting out 
with new and risky schemes. Almost three-quarters of the activities covered controlling 
and implementing regulations (72%), while in 19% of cases procurement or contract 
administration were the issue. Small numbers were involved in theft or in appointing 
personnel and expenses, which includes the selection and hiring of public servants or 
staff, and declarations about refundable expenses. 
 
Finally, and most importantly, is the result, which overwhelmingly was a loss of 
governance capacity. This consists of the inability to provide safety or ensure standards. 
Eighty percent of cases involved governance capacity loss, and only 20% produced 
financial loss2.  
 
Extortive bribes were not the dominant characteristic.  The dollar amounts received were 
generally small and the risks involved, seem to demonstrate the lack of capacity of public 
employees to exert a high level of pressure on their “clients”. 
 
This also means that the major problem of controlling corruption seems to be in the 
human interface between low-level public servants (either, in inspectorial, management 
or service delivery positions) and private business people, or those receiving human 
services. Extortive bribes could exist, nevertheless, in cases involving politics, As table 3 
shows politicians obtained higher levels of payment..  Again, it is important to remember 
that this finding represents the sample used in this study, and is not necessarily 
generalizable.  
 
Developing preventive strategies will depend on an understanding of the context of the 
corrupt act, and important here is whether people act alone or as a team. To start with, 
most activities involved solo actors (80%) while only 20% worked in collusion (Table 1). The 
patterns for people working alone were different from those working in collusion. Those 
working alone received much smaller dollar amounts than those working in collusion, 
however politician (alone) were able to achieve larger amounts. Two-thirds of those working 
alone received less than $1000, and 10 of the 57 received less than $100.  
 
2 As we said before, this only refers to the immediate effect of the corrupt act. New York City lost ability to 
obtain increased oversight and regulatory compliance from the work of the public employees involved, 
because of the corrupt act in cases of governance capacity loss. However, the final outcome of each case is 
dependent not only in the conduct, but in its detection, and on the effect that its detection and adequate 
processing could create, aspects that are out of the scope of this study. 
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Although the data are not as robust as we would like, Table 2 shows that the activities of 
those acting alone were much more likely to result in capacity loss than money loss. They 
were much more likely to involve the violation of a procedure, while those acting in collusion 
were just as likely to be creating opportunities as violating procedures. Where people act 
alone the initiating offender is more likely to be a private person, but when there is 
collusion, the initiative overwhelmingly comes from public servants. The table also shows 
that almost half of those acting alone were in the infrastructure sector, while team players 
favored this sector least. 
 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 
The size of the bribe does not show any variations when examining the category initiating 
offender, but inspectors and low-level workers were likely to get smaller amounts than 
supervisors or politicians. No politicians in the sample received less than $10,000, but only 
one inspector and one low-level worker managed this amount. There were only slight 
differences in the amounts received in any of the sectors, though of the four cases where 
there amounts over $1 million, two were sole operators, and two were team operations. 
Where there was governance capacity loss, the amounts were considerably lower than 
where there was monetary loss. 
 
Not surprisingly, inspectors and low-level workers are almost exclusively involved in 
controlling or implementing regulations, while supervisors are more likely to be involved 
in corruption relating to procurement and administering contracts, while politicians, when 
involved, are more likely to misappropriate or manipulate expenses, as table 3 shows. 
 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
 
Appropriate intervention can be built on a better understanding of the results of the 
activities or of the participants, namely the types of public servants involved. Of the four 
types of public servants, the activities of politicians and supervisors were most likely to 
result in money loss while the activities of inspectors and low-level public servants were 
most likely to result in governance capacity loss3. In fact there was no money loss from 
3 It is important to keep in mind that when talking about governance capacity loss, is in reference to the public 
decision involved by the act. Of course, if the same concept is analyzed from a state capture perspective, the 
result would always be that there is a governance capacity loss when political leaders are involved in corrupt 
acts, because of the inherent risk of state capture. 
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the activities of inspectors. Where inspectors were corrupt, the initiating offender was 
nearly always a private citizen, rather than another public official. 
 
The emerging picture is that inspectors are approached by private citizens to overlook or 
disregard some infraction, and this results in governance capacity loss to the city, because 
of the failure to control or implement the city’s regulatory requirements, as shown in 
Table 3. 
 
A different pattern prevails with supervisors, who are more likely to engage in contract or 
procurement irregularities. They are also more likely to become the initiating offender, 
and the result of their corrupt activities is money loss to the city. Intervention strategies to 
target supervisors, inspectors, low-level workers and politicians would therefore be 
different. 
 
When we turn to results, two variables were used, loss of governance capacity and loss of 
money. These are shown in Table 4. Overwhelmingly the city lost governance capacity due 
to corrupt behavior. Only 14 of the 72 cases resulted in money loss to the city, but where 
this occurred the losses were often substantial. In the four cases where over $1 million 
was lost, the initiators/ beneficiaries were all public servants. In fact for all cases over 
$100,000 the initiating offender was a public servant. Eight of the 11 cases which involved 
more than $100,000 were in the human services, and the remainder in infrastructure. This 
was mostly in procurement and contract administration, and the beneficiary was nearly 
always a public servant acting alone. 
 
Governance capacity loss, however, is very serious for the city and mostly involves 
violating procedures in the controlling and implementing of regulation. Governance 
capacity loss benefitted private individuals more than it did public servants, and resulted 
mostly from perpetrators acting alone. 
 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
 
Careful examination of Table 4 reveals interesting patterns which can inform anti-corruption 
interventions. Overall initiating offenders were just as likely to be public servants or private 
citizens, but in two-thirds of the capacity loss cases (N=38) the initiating offender was a 
private person and not a public servant. Similarly beneficiaries were split evenly between 
public servants and private citizens but where there was capacity loss, in 58% of cases the 
beneficiary was a private citizen (N=34). Where there was money loss all offenders were 
public servants, and none were private citizens.  The losers are the general public. 
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The research has found that where there is capacity loss a private citizen initiates the 
corrupt act and more often than not a private citizen is the main beneficiary (through a 
relaxation of a regulation or requirement). Where there is money loss to the city the initiator 
and main beneficiary is always a public servant or politician. 
 
With capacity loss the monetary bribes are very small. With money loss the amounts 
involved are much larger. Where there is capacity loss, in 69% of cases (N=40) the amount 
changing hands was less than $1,000. When there was money loss, in 13 of the 14 cases 
(93%) the amounts involved were over $1,000. Inspectors and low-level workers who were 
involved in 72% of all corruption cases made up 86% of capacity loss cases. Small amounts of 
money to these people therefore, weakened the city’s governance and regulatory authority. 
The big fish took bigger amounts but the money was more important in their cases than the 
procedure that was violated. Where money was lost, all 14 cases involved creation of 
opportunities but with capacity loss 80% of cases (N=46) involved violation of procedures 
rather than creation of opportunity. 
 
Conclusion 
 
While the study demonstrated certain types of corruption and their effects, it did not assess 
the prevalence of corruption in New York City, nor the penalties imposed on prosecution. 
However, it can be assumed that previous lessons have helped New York City to deal with 
political machines and organized crime, since most of the cases in the sample represent low-
level public employees committing low effect corrupt acts. This does not mean that 
corruption is no longer a problem; on the contrary, it is very real and is a cause for concern 
for the city government and the citizens of New York. These data can help us move forward 
in one or more ways, and these ways forward are applicable across the spectrum of public 
administration. 
 
Corrupt behavior can be thought of in terms of the familiar risk/reward relationship. Much 
of the activity reported in this study clusters in the low risk–low reward region of this 
relationship. A very small number of cases are found in the high risk–high reward region. The 
latter tend to be the headline cases of political corruption whereas the former reflect low 
level corruption at an individual level – behaviors that, in generating governance failures, can 
also have significant damaging collective impacts. 
 
The policy challenge is to design regimes that push up the risks and drive down the rewards 
in this space. The data collected in this study is a start for new assessments of anti-
corruption approaches in relation to the risk–reward relationship. These assessments might 
focus on three types of interventions. 
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First, there are changes in the culture of the city’s administration, and the backing of these 
changes by legislation and best practice administration. Second, there is a legal and law 
enforcement approach in which corrupt acts are criminalized, investigated, prosecuted, and 
penalties levied against the offenders. Third, there is a crime prevention approach in which 
lessons from successful early intervention and crime prevention can be used to minimise the 
opportunities for corruption and to make it more difficult to commit corrupt acts. 
 
In dealing with organizational culture, ethics need continually to be stressed and reinforced, 
and clear messages need to be communicated about what it is that is acceptable behavior 
and what is not acceptable. Excuses are often given for corrupt behavior because there is no 
clear message about unacceptable or dubious behavior. Often colleagues who transgress 
give the impression that their activities are what everybody does, or have always done. If 
there is no action against transgressors, particularly if the behavior is widely known, then the 
organization has a culture problem. Workplace practices of good behavior need to be 
rewarded and celebrated, and poor behavior penalized. Within an organization, anti-
corruption culture needs to be reinforced with good personnel management and job design, 
reporting mechanisms for questionable behavior and no retribution against whistle blowers. 
Robert Klitgaard’s (1991) famous formula C = M+D-A (corruption equals monopoly plus 
discretion minus accountability), provides a basis for shaping culture and work activities. 
 
Within law enforcement there is a substantial body of legislation in most countries which 
makes illegal, activities like bribery, extortion, misappropriation and fraud. Legislation is less 
useful when dealing with issues such as patronage, abuse of discretion, nepotism, 
clientelism and favoritism, and conflict of interest. Here law and culture need to come 
together. In the U.S. investigating public corruption is the top criminal priority of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Yet in personal communication with senior FBI officials, they 
feel the task before them is so voluminous for the resources available. Much the same can 
be said with resources and processes devoted to prosecution, yet from time to time there 
are significant successes for prosecutors. There is an important field of study in examining 
criminal penalties for convicted offenders, and whether this has a deterrent effect. 
 
Turning to the third intervention, crime prevention, a routine activity theory approach, 
would break each activity into its smallest component parts and examine concepts of crimes 
of specialized access (Felson and Boba 2010, 123). Studying targets, opportunities, and 
guardians could lead to a theory-based analysis, which could help to produce some 
environmental crime prevention initiatives, which will become the core of our future work 
on this issue. In specific, using the routine activity approach, it would be possible to examine 
the practices of the public servants involved and their routine interactions with private 
agents. After that, following Goldstein (1990), a problem solving approach could be applied 
to scan available data to detect similar patterns involving several individual incidents, and 
analyze those findings to detect the most relevant aspects of those routines that need to be 
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modified or controlled to produce the desired outcome of corruption prevention. After that, 
a specific policy response could be designed, applied and assessed, to review its efficacy.  
 
This analysis could target different kinds of public officers.  As shown, different kinds of 
public officers seem to have different corruption risk consequences. (politicians = money 
loss; inspectors = governance capacity loss). This consideration could allow the development 
of a regulatory system of prevention and response, one that is more suited to the specifics of 
New York City.  
 
The findings from this study call for further analysis, based on better but more expansive 
sample designs, which could produce an accurate picture of possible predictors in the 
understanding of specific mechanisms underlying corruption in cities. However, in spite of 
the validity issues related to this sample there is still room for additional analysis to 
produce causal explanations applicable to the studied cases, and from them, to develop 
some general propositions about policies that could be adopted to tackle corruption in 
New York City and apply them to other cities. 
 
In addition to further studies of the nature and type of capacity loss and its consequences, 
this study points to at least two additional studies.  One relates to the dynamics behind the 
hypothesis that the payment level of bribes increases as the position and status of the 
beneficiary increases.  The second is a study of penalties, and exploration of whether the 
penalties are related to the capacity losses or monetary losses experienced by the city, or 
related to the perpetrator’s reward in dollars.  
 
While small bribes, rarely more than a few hundred dollars, are common in the study, the 
loss to the city is a loss of governance capacity, in that its legislation in respect of health, 
safety, human services, town planning and other regulatory behavior can be circumvented.  
The city has laws and regulations, and has developed and funded an infrastructure to 
implement these, yet it cannot always achieve the result it desires.  The losers are the 
residents of the city because the protective measures legislated by the city can be 
circumvented for relatively small rewards. 
 
Our single main finding in this context is existence of mostly petty corruption in the form of 
low bribes payments, linked to the position and function that public officers perform in New 
York City. The main consequence of this is a loss of governance capacity, and this is a greater 
and more prevalent loss than a monetary loss. 
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Tables 
TABLE 1  Summary of data (N= 72) 
Category Subcategory Frequency % 
Initiating Offender Private person 38 52.8 
 
Public servant 34 47.2 
 
total 72 100 
Beneficiary Private person 37 51.4 
 
Public servant 35 48.6 
 
total 72 100 
Acting Alone or as Team Alone 57 79.2 
 
Team 15 20.8 
 
total 72 100 
Kind of Public Servant Involved Inspector 36 50 
 
Low-level worker 16 22.2 
 
Supervisor 14 19.4 
 
Politician 5 6.9 
 
N/A 1 1.4 
 
total 72 100 
Size of Bribe/Kickback ($) 0 1 1.4 
 
<100 11 15.3 
 
101-1,000 29 40.3 
 
1,001-10,000 8 11.1 
 
10,001-100,000 5 6.9 
 
100,001-1,000,000 7 9.7 
 
>1,000,000 4 5.6 
 
Unspecified 7 9.7 
 
total 72 100 
Kind of Infraction Violating regulations 53 73.6 
 
Theft 13 18.1 
 
Abuse of political influence 4 5.6 
 
Theft/Violating regulations 2 2.8 
 
total 72 100 
Sector Infrastructure 30 41.7 
 
Human Services 21 29.2 
 
Health and Environment 20 27.8 
 
Whole of government 1 1.4 
 
total 72 100 
Process Violation of procedure 46 63.9 
 
Creation of opportunity 26 36.1 
 
total 72 100 
Nature of Activity Controlling or implementing regulation 52 72.2 
 
Procurement and administrating contracts 14 19.4 
 
Stealing 4 5.6 
 
Appointing personal / expenses 2 2.8 
 
total 72 100 
Result Governance capacity loss 58 80.6 
 
Money loss 14 19.4 
 
total 72 100 
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TABLE 2  Acting Alone or as Team (N=72) 
 
Alone Team Total 
Process 
   Creation of opportunity 18 8 26 
Violation of procedure 39 7 46 
Total 57 15 72 
Initiating Offender 
   Private person 33 5 38 
Public servant 24 10 34 
Total 57 15 72 
Sector 
   Health and Environment 14 6 20 
Human Services 15 6 21 
Infrastructure 27 3 30 
Whole of government 1 
 
1 
Total 57 15 72 
Result 
   Capacity loss 47 11 58 
Money loss 10 4 14 
Total 57 15 72 
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TABLE3  Type of Public Servant (N=72) 
 
Type of 
Public 
Servant 
Initiating 
Offender Nature of Activity Result 
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Inspector 32 4 36  36   36 36  36 
Low-Level 
Worker 2 14 16  12 3 1 16 14 2 16 
N/A 1  1   1  1 1  1 
Politician  5 5 2  1 2 5 1 4 5 
Supervisor 3 11 14  4 9 1 14 6 8 14 
Total 38 34 72 2 52 14 4 72 58 14 72 
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TABLE 4  Capacity Loss/ Money Loss (N=72) 
 
 
Result 
  
Governance 
capacity loss Money loss Total 
Initiating Offender 
   Private person 38 
 
38 
Public servant 20 14 34 
Total 58 14 72 
Beneficiary 
   Private person 34 3 37 
Public servant 24 11 35 
Total 58 14 72 
Acting Alone or in a Team 
   Alone 47 10 57 
Team 11 4 15 
Total 58 14 72 
Kind of Public Servant 
   Inspector 36 
 
36 
Low-level worker  14 2 16 
Supervisor 6 8 14 
Politician 1 4 5 
N/A 1 
 
1 
Total 58 14 72 
Size of Bribe/Kickback ($) 
   0 - 1000 40 1 41 
>1000 11 13 24 
Unspecified 7 
 
7 
Total 58 14 72 
Kind of Infraction 
   Violating regulations 52 1 53 
Theft 3 10 13 
Abuse of political influence 1 3 4 
Theft/Violating regulations 2 
 
2 
Total 58 14 72 
Sector 
   Infrastructure 28 2 30 
Human Services 10 11 21 
Health and Environment 20 
 
20 
Whole of government 
 
1 1 
Total 58 14 72 
Process 
   Violation of procedure 46 
 
46 
Creation of opportunity 12 14 26 
Total 58 14 72 
Nature of Activity 
   Controlling or implementing regulation 52 
 
52 
Procurement and administrating contracts 5 9 14 
Stealing 1 3 4 
Appointing personal/expenses 
 
2 2 
Total 58 14 72 
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